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Introduction 
 
Crowding on urban mass transit systems is common in both 
developed and developing countries. A roundtable report by the 
International Transport Forum identifies crowding as a major source 
of inconvenience that increases the generalized cost of travel (OECD, 
2014). Crowding occurs not only while riding buses and trains, but 
also when boarding and alighting from them, when purchasing 
tickets, while waiting on platforms or at stops, and while accessing 
stations by escalator, elevator or on foot (King et al., 2014). 
 
Several recent studies have documented the cost of crowding on 
transit networks. For example, Prud'homme et al. (2012) estimate that 
the 8% increase in densities in the Paris subway between 2002 and 
2007 imposed a welfare loss of at least €75 million per year. Veitch et 
al. (2013) estimate the annual total cost of crowding in Melbourne 
metropolitan trains in 2011 at $280 million. 
 
Tirachini et al. (2013) provide a detailed review of the extensive 
literature on public transport crowding. Studies find that crowding 
increases in-vehicle time and waiting time, reduces travel time 
reliability, and causes stress and feelings of exhaustion. A number of 
studies document how disutility from in-vehicle time increases with 
the number of users. 
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There is a large operations research literature on public transit system 
design. An extensive economic literature has also developed on 
public transit capacity investments, service frequency, and optimal 
pricing and subsidy policy. These two branches of literature have 
made significant advances in understanding public transit systems. 
However, in contrast to the literature on automobile traffic 
congestion, most of the studies have employed static models that 
cannot account for travelers' time-of-use decisions and the dynamics 
of transit congestion and crowding. 
 
The time profile of ridership is driven by the trade-off that users face 
between traveling at peak times and suffering crowding, and avoiding 
the peak by traveling earlier or later than they would like. A few 
studies2 have explored this trade-off using simple microeconomic 
models that combine trip-scheduling preferences as introduced by 
Vickrey (1969) with a crowding cost function that describes how 
utility from travel decreases with passenger loads. In this paper we 
use this modeling framework to analyze usage of a rail transit line, 
and assess the potential benefits from internalizing crowding 
externalities by setting differential train fares. We also present results 
on optimal train capacity and the number of trains put into service. 
 
The model 
 
Consider a transit line that connects two stations without intermediate 
stops. The line operates on a timetable to which the operator adheres 
precisely. There are m trains, indexed in order of departure. Train k 
leaves the origin station at time kt . The time headway between 
successive trains is a constant, h, so that 1k kt t h   , 1,..., 1k m  . 
The headway is set at the minimum feasible value consistent with 
safe operation. Travel time aboard a train is independent of both 
departure time and train occupancy, and without loss of generality it 
is normalized to zero. Each train therefore arrives at the destination as 
soon as it leaves the origin station. 
 
Each morning, a fixed number, N, of identical individuals use the line 
to get to work. Users know the timetable, and have to choose which 
train to take. They prefer to reach the destination at a common time, 
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*t . If they arrive before *t , they incur a disutility or “schedule delay 
costˮ of   per minute they are early. For late arrival the penalty is   
per minute. Hence, the schedule delay cost of taking train k,  kt , is 
(1)    * * ,   1,...,k k kt t t t t k m  
 
           , 
where  max 0,x x  . Users are assumed to board a train in random 
order, and (as in de Palma et al., 2015) thus cannot increase their 
chance of securing a good seat by arriving at the origin station early. 
The expected cost of crowding is  g n , where n is the number of 
users taking the same train. Function  g n  is an average over 
possible states: securing a good seat, getting a bad seat, having to 
stand in the middle of the corridor, standing close to the door, etc.. In 
this paper we assume that   /g n n s , where 0   and 0s   is a 
measure of train capacity. The linear form is supported by the meta-
analysis of Wardman and Whelan (2011). 
 
Let 
kn  denote the number of users on train k. A user taking train k 
incurs a combined schedule delay and crowding cost of 
  * * ,   1,..., .kk k k
n
c t t t t k m
s
  
 
             
User equilibrium with a uniform fare 
In this subsection we derive and characterize user equilibrium (UE) 
when N is fixed, and the fare is uniform; i.e. the same for all trains. A 
uniform fare does not affect either the division of users between trains 
or crowding costs. Let ec  denote the equilibrium trip cost net of fare, 
and 
e
kn  equilibrium ridership on train k. In UE, users distribute 
themselves between the m trains so that the user cost net of fare on 
every train is ec . Given eq. (1) this implies 
(2)   ,   1,..., .
e
ek
k
n
t c k m
s
     
Since every user has to take some train, 
(3) 
1
.
m e
kk
n N

  
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Equilibrium ridership is solved by substituting eq. (2) into  (3): 
(4)   ,   1,...,ek k
N s
n t k m
m
 

      , 
where  
1
/
m
kk
t m 

  is the unweighted average scheduling cost 
per train. Equation (4) reveals that timely trains (i.e., train that arrive 
closer to *t  and have lower   kt ) carry more users than other 
trains. The difference in passenger loads between two successive 
trains is proportional to train capacity, s, and the headway between 
trains, h, and inversely proportional to users' sensitivity to crowding, 
 . The equilibrium user cost works out to 
(5) e
N
c
ms

  . 
Aggregate travel costs are easily derived. Let SDC denote total 
schedule delay costs, TCC total crowding costs, and TC total travel 
costs net of the fare. It is straightforward to show that 
(6)  2e
s
SDC N m 

   , 
(7)  
2
2e N sTCC m
ms



    , 
(8) 
2
,e e e
N
TC SDC TCC N
ms

     
where  
2
1
m
kk
t

      and 
2 0m   by the Cauchy-Schwarz 
inequality. 
 
In equilibrium, total schedule delay costs are lower than if users were 
equally distributed across trains (in which case eSDC N ) because 
users crowd onto timely trains that arrive closer to *t . Total crowding 
costs are higher by the same amount, so that total costs are the same 
as if users were equally distributed.  
 
We now derive the optimal uniform fare. The equilibrium private cost 
of a trip, 
ep , equals the user cost plus the fare,  : 
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(9) .e
N
p
ms

      
From eq. (8), the marginal social cost of a trip is: 
(10) 
2
.
e
e TC NMSC
N ms



  

 
The first term in (10) is the same as in (5). The second term is 
proportional to N, and it is twice the corresponding term in (5) 
because the marginal social cost of crowding is twice the average 
cost. The average external cost is 
 e e e
N
MEC MSC c
ms

   . 
With elastic demand, considered later, it is optimal to charge a 
uniform fare equal to the average external cost: 
(11) ,u
N
ms

   
where superscript “uˮ denotes the uniform-fare optimum. Total 
revenue from the optimal uniform fare is 
(12) 
2
.u u
N
R N
ms

    
Given eqs. (11) and (9), the equilibrium private cost of a trip is 
(13) 
2
.u
N
p
ms

   
The uniform fare does not support the social optimum because the 
marginal external cost of crowding varies with train occupancy, and it 
is larger on more heavily used trains. The social optimum is 
examined in the following subsection. 
 
Social Optimum 
In the social optimum (SO), the marginal social cost of trips is the 
same on all trains. The marginal social cost of using train k is 
 
 
  .k k kk k
k
c n n
MSC t
n s


 
  

 
Let superscript “oˮ denote the SO, and oMSC  the marginal social 
cost of a trip. At the optimum, 
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(14)   ,   1,..., .okk k
n
MSC t MSC k m
s



     
Since every user takes some train, the counterpart to eq. (3) holds: 
(15) 
1
.
m o
kk
n N

  
Solving eqs. (14) and (15) one obtains 
(16)   ,   1,...,
2
o
k k
N s
n t k m
m
 

      , 
(17) 
2
.o
N
MSC
ms

   
It is evident from eqs. (16) and (4) that train loads in the SO are more 
even than in the uniform-fare equilibrium. Spreading users is 
desirable because the cost of crowding is a quadratic function of load, 
and the benefits from reducing loads on timely trains exceed the costs 
of greater crowding on other trains. 
 
The SO usage pattern can be decentralized by charging a fare on train 
k equal to the marginal external cost of usage. We will call this fare 
pattern the SO-fare. The marginal external cost of usage on train k is 
 ,   1,..., .kk k k
n
MEC MSC c k m
s

     
The SO-fare on train k is therefore: 
(18) 
 
,   1,..., .
2
o
ko k
k
tn N
k m
s ms
  


     
Compared to the uniform fare in eq. (11), the fare in (18) is higher on 
timely trains and lower on the earliest and latest trains. Users of all 
trains incur a private cost equal to the social cost of a trip:  
 
2
,   1,..., .o o o ok k k
N
p c MSC k m
ms

        
The private cost is the same as the cost with the uniform fare in eq. 
(13). It is higher than the cost if no fares are charged. To see this, note 
that at least one train is more crowded in the SO than the UE. 
Compared to the UE, in the SO a rider of this train incurs the same 
schedule delay cost, but a higher crowding cost and a positive fare. 
Since all users incur the same private cost in the UE, and all users 
incur the same private cost in the SO, private costs are higher in the 
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SO. Unless fare revenues are used to improve service in some way, 
charging fares to price crowding costs leaves users worse off.  
 
Total revenue from the SO-fare is 
1
mo o o
k kk
R n

 . Using eqs. (16) 
and (18) one obtains 
(19)  
2
2 .
4
o N sR m
ms



     
The first term in (19) matches revenue from the optimal uniform fare 
in (12). The second term is extra revenue due to variation of the fare. 
This will be called variable revenue, oRV , where3 
(20)   
 
 
2
2 2 3
2
.
4 48
o
ss
RV m h m


   
   

 
Other aggregate costs in the SO work out to: 
(21) 2o e oSDC SDC RV  , 
(22) 3o e oTCC TCC RV  , 
(23) .o e oTC TC RV   
Total schedule delay costs are higher in the SO than the uniform-fare 
or no-fare equilibrium. However, crowding costs are smaller by 1.5 as 
much, and total costs are lower by variable revenue.  
 
As indicated in eq. (20), variable revenue is independent of N. The 
welfare gain from setting optimal fares is therefore independent of 
total usage. This may seem surprising since intuition would suggest 
that the welfare gain increases with N: first because crowding 
becomes more onerous for users on average, and second because 
more users suffer the higher cost. To understand the result, recall that 
the welfare gain arises from distributing users more evenly between 
trains. Since the difference in crowding costs between two successive 
trains equals the difference in schedule delay costs, the benefit from 
reallocating users between trains is independent of N. As N increases, 
marginal crowding costs on each train rise at the same rate. The 
uniform-fare component of the optimal toll in eq. (18) increases 
linearly with N, but the variable component does not change. 
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Another way to view the result is in terms of total costs. The marginal 
social costs of usage in the UE and SO are given in eqs. (11) and (17) 
respectively. Since the equations are the same, the marginal social 
costs are the same. In effect, the benefits of internalizing the 
crowding cost externality are exhausted once total usage is large 
enough for all trains to be used — as assumed throughout the paper. 
 
In a longer version of this paper (de Palma, Lindsey and 
Monchambert, 2015) we have shown that the welfare gains from 
congestion pricing depend on the shape of the crowding cost function, 
 .g . If  .g  is convex, the welfare gain decreases with N, and if 
 .g  is concave, the welfare gain increases with N. Most empirical 
studies find that  .g  is either linear or convex. This suggests that the 
benefits of differentiating fares by train (or, equivalently, time of day) 
may be limited on heavily used transit systems. The model thus offers 
one explanation for why peak-load pricing on transit systems is not 
very common. 
 
Optimal transit service with elastic demand 
 
We now turn attention to the long run when the transit authority can 
choose the number of trains, m, train capacity, s, and the train 
timetable. We continue to assume that all trains have the same 
capacity, and that the headway is uniform and exogenous. When the 
schedule delay and crowding cost functions are linear, as assumed, 
the optimal timetable is straightforward to derive and, due to space 
constraints, it is not described here. 
 
To investigate the optimal values of m and s we assume that the 
capital, operations and maintenance costs of providing service are 
described by a function  ,K m s  which is strictly increasing in m and 
s. To facilitate analysis, m will be treated as a continuous variable. 
 
We now allow total usage to depend on the price, defined in eq. (9), 
and let  p N  denote the inverse demand curve. With a uniform fare, 
social surplus net of capacity costs is 
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(24)    
2
0
 , .
N
e
n
N
SS p n dn N K m s
ms



 
    
 
  
The transit authority chooses m and s to maximize eSS . With a zero 
fare, the first-order conditions work out to: 
(25) 
2
2
For  with zero fare :        ,
/
N
s
N
p NN
s K
p N N msms




 
(26) 
2
For  with zero fare :      
/
N
m
N
p NN
m N K
m p N N msm s
 

 
  
  
, 
where 
sK and mK are derivatives of  ,K m s  with respect to s and m 
respectively. The first term of the product on the left-hand side of 
(25) is the marginal benefit from expanding train capacity if usage 
remained fixed. The average cost of crowding would decrease by 
 2/N ms for the N users. The actual reduction in crowding is 
smaller than this because the improved service quality attracts new 
users. Because usage is underpriced, the increase in usage is welfare-
reducing which shrinks the benefit from greater capacity. This latent 
demand effect accounts for the second term of the product on the left-
hand side of (25) which is less than 1. In the limit of perfectly elastic 
demand (i.e., 0Np  , the potential benefit is completely dissipated. 
In the opposite limit of fixed demand (i.e., Np  ), the second 
term converges to 1, and there is no dilution of benefit. 
 
Equation (26) for m is interpreted similarly. The first term in brackets 
on the left-hand side is the marginal benefit from less crowding. The 
second term in brackets is the marginal disbenefit due to greater 
schedule delay costs. This net benefit is diluted by the same factor as 
in eq. (25). With the optimal uniform fare, the first-order conditions 
work out to: 
(27) 
2
2
For  with optimal uniform fare :      ,s
N
s K
ms

  
(28) 
2
For  with optimal uniform fare :       .m
N
m N K
mm s
  
  
 
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In contrast to eqs. (25) and (26), the marginal benefits from 
expanding service in eqs. (27) and (28) are not diluted by additional 
usage because usage is priced efficiently. This might suggest that the 
optimal values of s and m, *
os  and *
om , are larger than their 
counterparts with a zero fare, *
ns  and *
nm . However, at least for given 
values of s and m, usage is higher in the no-fare regime because the 
private cost of usage is lower. This leaves the rankings of *
os  and *
ns , 
and *
om  and *
nm , theoretically ambiguous in general. 
 
With the SO-fare, social surplus net of capacity costs is given by 
(29)      
2
0
 , ,
N
o o
n
N
SS p n dn N K m s RV m s
ms



 
     
 
 . 
Equation (29) is the same as eq. (24) except for the last term, oRV , 
which is a function of m and s, but does not depend on N. Since usage 
is priced efficiently in both the SO-fare and optimal uniform-fare 
regimes, the first-order conditions for s and m are the same as for the 
optimal uniform toll, (27) and (28), with the derivatives of 
   , ,oK m s RV m s  in place of the derivatives of  ,K m s . Hence, 
(30) 
2
2
For  in the SO :      ,os s
N
s K RV
ms

   
(31) 
2
For  in the SO :       om m
N
m N K RV
mm s
  
   
 
, 
where 
o
sRV  and 
o
mRV  denote the derivatives of  ,
oRV m s  with 
respect to s and m respectively. The right-hand sides of eqs. (30) and 
(31) are smaller than their counterparts for the optimal uniform toll, 
(27) and (28). The generation of variable revenue from the SO-fare 
effectively reduces the marginal financial cost of expanding capacity. 
In the case of (30) this implies that optimal train capacity conditional 
on the values of m and N is larger in the SO:    * *, ,
o us m N s m N . 
Similarly, eq. (31) implies that the optimal number of trains 
conditional on the values of s and N is also larger in the social 
optimum:    * *, ,
o um s N m s N . 
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These rankings may seem surprising given that total system costs are 
lower in the SO than the uniform-fare equilibrium. Inequality 
   * *, ,
o um s N m s N  is explained by the fact that ridership is 
distributed more evenly across trains in the SO. More users take the 
earliest and latest trains in the SO which makes adding extra trains 
more beneficial. The reason for the inequality    * *, ,
o us m N s m N  
is more subtle. It can be shown that while total user costs in the 
uniform-fare regime decrease with s, the deadweight loss from 
imbalanced ridership between trains increases with s. Expanding 
capacity is therefore more valuable in the social optimum. By 
contrast, in the Vickrey (1969) bottleneck model of road traffic 
congestion, optimal capacity is higher with a uniform fare. 
 
A numerical example 
 
Further properties of the model are difficult to derive analytically, and 
to proceed further we now adopt a specific capacity function that is 
based on Kraus and Yoshida (2002): 
(32)    0 1 2,K m s s m s     , 
where 
0v , 1v  and 2v  are all nonnegative parameters. The term 
0 1s   in (32) is the incremental cost of running an additional train, 
which includes both capital and operating costs. It is a linear 
increasing function of train capacity. If 
0 0v  , there are scale 
economies with respect to train size. The second term in (32), 2s , 
accounts for costs that depend on train capacity, but not the number 
of trains, such as terminal capital costs. 
 
The numerical example draws on recent empirical estimates of 
crowding costs, and is loosely calibrated to describe service on the 
Paris RER A line during the morning peak.4 Base-case parameter 
values are:  =5 [€/(hr⋅user)],  =20 [€/(hr⋅user)],  =2.72 [€/user], 
and  h=2 [min/train]. The demand function is assumed to have a 
constant-elasticity form 0N N p
  with  =-1/3.5 Parameters 
0N , 
0 ,v  1v  and 2v  are chosen to yield equilibrium values for the optimal 
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uniform-fare equilibrium of uN =18,700, *
um =24, *
us =800 and fare 
revenue equal to 5/6 of capacity costs.  The resulting values are: 
0N
=35,598, 0v =412.8, 1v =0.5058 and 2v =49.78. Results for the three 
fare regimes are reported in Table 1. 
 
With no fare, the equilibrium private cost (which equals the 
equilibrium user cost) is €4.54. There are nN =21,500 users who are 
accommodated in *
nm =25.27 trains with (nominal) capacities of *
ns
=811. Total crowding costs are more than double total schedule delay 
costs. Capital costs ( nK ) amount to a little over 60% of total user 
costs ( nTC ). Given no fare, cost recovery,  , is zero. 
 
The optimal uniform fare works out to u = €2.65. It boosts the 
equilibrium private cost to 
up = €6.90 which is €2.36 above the no-
fare equilibrium price. Ridership drops to uN =18,700 which is 13% 
below the no-fare level. Both the number of trains and train capacity 
are also lower than with no fare although capacity costs are reduced 
by only 2.8%. Total crowding costs and total schedule delay costs are 
also lower than with no fare. Consumers' surplus is lower than with 
no fare, but social surplus is higher by €4,135 or about €0.22 per rider 
in the uniform-fare equilibrium. The relative efficiency of the optimal 
uniform fare can be measured as a fraction of the difference in social 
surplus between the SO and the no-fare equilibrium. It works out to 
about 0.82 so that the optimal uniform fare yields most of the 
efficiency gains from the SO-fare. 
 
The SO features more trains than either the no-fare or the uniform-
fare regime. However, train capacity is slightly lower than in the 
other two regimes. Ridership and consumers' surplus are slightly 
higher than with a uniform fare, whereas price, revenue per user and 
cost recovery are slightly lower. Crowding costs are significantly 
lower than in the other two regimes, but schedule delay costs are 
higher than with a uniform fare because the SO-fare spreads usage 
more evenly over trains. Capacity costs are intermediate between the 
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other two regimes. Social surplus is higher than with no fare by about 
€0.27 per rider. 
 
No-fare (n )Opt. uniform (u ) Social opt. (o )
m 25.27 24 25.69
s 811 800 787
N 21,500 18,700 18,814
p 4.54 6.90 6.77
Rev/user 0.00 2.65 2.63
TCC 68,493 55,563 49,424
SDC 29,092 23,896 28,588
TC 97,584 79,459 78,012
K 61,164 59,447 60,029
R 0 49,539 49,424
ρ 0 0.833 0.823324901
CS 1,004,019 956,898 959,244
SS 942,856 946,990 948,638
Gain/N
u
0.22 0.27
Rel.eff 0.00 0.822 1
Fare regime
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of no-fare, optimal uniform fare, and SO-fare 
(i.e., social optimum) regimes: base-case parameter values 
 
The number of trains has been treated as a continuous variable 
although it is discrete in reality. The model was resolved by 
restricting m to integer values to obtain 
*
nm =25 and *
om =26. Results 
were hardly affected, and social surplus was virtually unchanged.  
 
To test the sensitivity of the results to the demand function, solutions 
were derived with different values of the elasticity. With 0  , the 
uniform fare yields no welfare gain at all and merely transfers money 
from users to the transit authority. The SO-fare yielded a welfare gain 
of only €0.097 compared to €0.27 in the base case. With 2/3   , 
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the optimal uniform-fare yields a much higher welfare gain of €0.42. 
The welfare gain from the SO increases too to €0.51, and the relative 
efficiency of the uniform-fare regime is little changed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have studied the time profile of ridership on a 
crowded rail transit line. We solve for the user equilibrium and social 
optimum when supply is fixed, as well as the long run when service 
can be optimized. Some of the results parallel those obtained with 
road traffic congestion models. Passenger loads are distributed more 
evenly across trains in the social optimum than the user equilibrium. 
The social optimum can be decentralized by charging higher fares on 
more popular trains to internalize the crowding cost externality on 
each train. Imposing differentiated fares makes users worse off --- at 
least before accounting for how the revenues are used. Other results 
are less obvious. The welfare gains from tolling are independent of 
total ridership. Expanding the number of trains can also be more 
valuable in the social optimum than the user equilibrium even though 
total system costs are lower in the social optimum. 
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